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GEOPOLITICAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN TIMES
OF TURMOIL*
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, lilt
I. INTRODUCTION
We live in exciting, even revolutionary, times. Every day we are
subjected to a barrage of new information about the rapid changes in
the international order. The fall of communism, the collapse of the
Soviet Empire, the rise of ethnic nationalism-all intrude on our daily
consciousness.
Historically, periods of fluidity in international affairs offer great
opportunities. Those statesmen and businessmen or women who can
perceive the shape of things to come can seize the chance and make
history-or a lot of money. But such periods are also characterized by
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instability and uncertainty. For history teaches that ideologies with a
world following cannot silently pass away, that empires do not quietly
commit suicide, and that a dramatic redistribution of world power al-
ways entails risk.
This kind of a world presents special opportunities and challenges
to businessmen or women who are forced by increasing globalization to
pay more attention to the world outside the US. A company in Tulsa, or
San Francisco or Chicago is likely today to find its competition coming
from Mexico, or China or Spain. Even more dramatically, huge and
dynamic overseas markets beckon. In the past five years, American
companies have invested more than $226 billion outside the United
States. No wonder: the markets of Asia grew on average more than 9%
per year, compared to 3% for the United States. India, with a popula-
tion of almost 1 billion, already has a middle class of about 250 mil-
lion. Over 300 million people are now counted in China's consuming
class. Closer to home, the economies of Mexico, Argentina and Brazil
have been dramatically reformed in the past five years. Despite ups and
downs, they offer significant markets and investment opportunities. In
sum, businessmen or women must look abroad because that is where
the opportunities are.
But businesspeople cannot be expected to risk stockholders' equity,
to take on significant debt or to enter into long-term contracts abroad
without some appreciation of the broader environment in which they
will do business. In short, they need to assess the commercial, econom-
ic and political risks of an overseas investment. Businesspeople are
accustomed to weighing commercial risks when they make an invest-
ment decision. And they know that economic risks-irresponsible mon-
etary or fiscal policies, uneven urban and rural growth rates, and cur-
rency depreciation--can also impact strongly on a business opportunity.
Perhaps the most important and difficult area to assess is political risk,
especially in the post-Cold War world. I would like to discuss the ma-
jor causes of political risks in the years ahead and then offer some
thoughts on how a business can assess the risks it faces doing business
abroad.
II. CAUSES OF POLITICAL RISK
The major cause of political risk is instability. In the coming years
there will be both structural and substantive causes of that instability.
A. Structural Causes of Instability
We have left behind the predictable, if somewhat frightening, days
of a bipolar world. The Soviet Union no longer exists and for now
Russia has few pretenses at being a world power, unable as it is even to
regulate the affairs of society within its own borders. Because the world
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is not presently threatened by the prospect of nuclear war between the
superpowers, we should enjoy a level of geo-strategic stability.
But this does not bring us into a "unipolar" world, as some assert.
Certainly America's military power is overwhelming compared to any
other nation. Yet, despite America's worldwide power and interests, we
are no longer able to dominate the international scene as we could
before. Our economic strength relative to other countries has dimin-
ished. The dollar is no longer king. And we cannot dictate to other
countries how they should behave.
We are moving instead to a multipolar world, characterized by a
number of states, perhaps as many as nine or ten, each of which is
strong enough to make itself heard on regional affairs and several of
which will be important world powers. Obviously Germany and Japan
will be in the latter category. France, Britain, Italy, India and China
will also play measurable roles. So too will a reconstituted Russia and
perhaps the Ukraine, though the impact of each will be limited until the
early years of the next century. To this list must be added a reunited
Korea, Indonesia, Brazil and perhaps South Africa and Iran.
History suggests that stability will be more difficult to achieve in a
multipolar world. Thus risks, whether for statesmen or businessmen,
will increase. A multipolar state system is inherently less stable than a
bipolar one. Europe lived under a multipolar system from the Treaty of
Westphalia in 1648 to the end to the Napoleonic Wars. Considering the
dismal history of those 150 years, it would be charitable to say that the
multipolar system was not a great success. Because the game of states
was played with many power centers, relations among countries were
fluid and difficult to predict. Miscalculations were easier to make-and
were made. Deterrence was harder to establish-and it often failed. Too
often there were strong incentives for aggression. For 60% of the time
since 1648 the Great Powers have been at war.
During the 19th century, from the Congress of Vienna to the out-
break of the first World War, Europe lived under a balance of power
system. A balance of power requires that a relatively small number of
countries interact in a geographically restricted area. Too many nations
and the calculations of balance become impossible; too few and the
situation becomes a zero sum game in which one nation's achievements
become another's loss. In this system hegemony, not equilibrium, be-
comes the object of international politics. Although the balance of pow-
er is maligned in America today, the system worked and gave the world
a century without a major international war.
The breakdown of the 19th century order ushered in a major Euro-
pean civil war which lasted from 1914 to 1945. Only then, did the
world re-establish a system wherein the interests of major powers were
once again balanced. This often-criticized bipolar world of the last forty
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years also worked. Smaller states were drawn into the orbit of the two
superpowers via alliance structures. These in turn provided security and
disincentives for aggression and destabilizing behavior.
Critics of the bipolar model assert that the superpower rivalry
exacerbated local and regional conflicts, as nations chose up sides be-
tween America and the Soviet Union. Yet one could argue that the
threat of superpower involvement was a powerful deterrent on regional
and local conflicts. Local leaders were concerned that if their disagree-
ments got out of hand, one or both of the superpowers would intervene.
This fear played a role in damping down the spread of such conflicts.
Moreover, the specter of escalating superpower involvement gave a
strong impetus to international efforts to stop local conflicts quickly.
By this analysis, superpower disengagement could contribute to
regional instabilities. Predatory regional powers may seek to exploit the
power vacuums left behind, aggrandizing themselves at their neighbors'
expense, as Iraq did in Kuwait, and Serbia in Yugoslavia. In sum, there
is reason to conclude that the structure of post-Cold War politics will
contribute to instability and risk.
B. Substantive Causes of Instability
As if the structural problems of a multipolar world were not
enough, a number of specific trends will contribute to political risk in
the decade ahead. I would like to focus on just four.
1. Nationalism
First, nationalism is on the rise. All the world's major powers are
pushing more nationalistic foreign policies today than they were 10
years ago. This trend will continue and has implications for European
and Asian stability.
Moreover, national feelings long dormant under a heavy hand of
communism, are reemerging throughout the former Soviet Empire. One
of the greatest tragedies of the Soviet Union was that its Republics
were largely, but incompletely, organized along ethnic lines. During
400 years of Russian imperialism, many ethnic groups became mixed
together in ways which will prove difficult to undo peacefully. Over
25% of the Soviet Unions population, some 70 million people, now live
outside their ethnic homeland. One Russian in six does not inhabit
Russia. Twenty percent of Ukrainians live outside the Ukraine. So as
the ideological glue of international communism gives way, many peo-
ples in the former Soviet Union turn automatically to nationalism as
their organizing principle. It is certain that in the coming decade, ethnic
tensions and violence will increase in the area of the former Soviet




Self-determination, a fundamental principle of Western diplomatic
policy since 1919, may add to instability by encouraging ethnic groups
to seek their own political structures at the expense of others. Today
only 10% of the world's countries are ethnically homogenous. So, de-
spite growing ethnic identification, the preservation of a multiethnic
model for nationhood is essential. The drama of Yugoslavia shows how
hard this may be-a country with five nationalities, four languages,
three religions and two alphabets. India, a nation rightly proud of its
long democratic tradition, faces growing ethnic and sectarian violence.
Sri Lanka is being torn apart by it.
2. Religious Extremism
If tolerance, in the form of democracy, might lead to instability in
certain countries, religious intolerance may threaten others. Over the
next ten years, religious extremism will contribute to a less peaceful
world.
First, religious extremism can threaten relations between nations.
For example, Iran has not yet emerged from its revolutionary period.
Until it does, that country will continue to be a cause for justifiable
concern among its neighbors, particularly the Arab states of the Gulf
and perhaps also Turkey. Iraq's continuing domestic problems offer the
religious extremists in Tehran another tempting target. Likewise, the
Islamic terrorist government of Sudan poses a threat to its neighbors. If
the Islamic extremists came to power in Algeria, that country would
unsettle its neighbors.
Religious intolerance may also produce profound political shocks
within countries, even to the point of threatening their internal cohe-
sion. I spoke of India, where extreme Hinduism has grown dramatically
in the last five years. Hopefully, the elections this April will show
extremism has peaked as a force there. Some Arab countries, notably
those of the Maghreb-already Tunisia and Algeria and, perhaps in the
future, Egypt-will be susceptible to Muslim extremism. In Israel, a
fundamentalist Jewish interpretation of Biblical history complicates both
the country's politics and international relations. Prime Minister Rabin's
assassination is the most recent reminder.
1. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which includes extremist Hindu elements, emerged as
the single biggest party in India's elections. However, its coalition government lasted only
twelve days before resigning in the face of a no-confidence vote. See Christopher Thomas,
India Premier Resigns After Party is Routed in Elections; Rao Quits as Ruling Congress is
Shamed by Third Place Finish, SAN FRANCISCO EXAM., May 10, 1996, at A2; Monthly Re-
view-4andmark Elections in Israel and India in May, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, June 1, 1996.
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3. Proliferation of Weapons
Another source of instability and risk is proliferation of dangerous
weapons and technologies. Unfortunately, science will continue to make
available lethal weapons and the means to deliver those weapons across
increasingly great distances, with improving accuracy.
In the years ahead, aspiring regional leaders will have at their
disposal an awesome arsenal of weapons. Already nuclear, biological
and chemical technology has spread to many countries. Yet the world
looked the other way when Libya, Iran and Iraq used chemical weap-
ons. Worse, the weapons work. Chemical weapons may have deter-
mined the outcome of the Iran-Iraq War. That lesson has not been lost
on regional powers.
The Gulf War provided a number of unsettling lessons. One lesson
was that the world's fifth largest army was no match for a highly tech-
nological army like ours-at least as long as the war was fought only
with conventional weapons. Another lesson is that the international
inspection regime, laboriously constructed over almost thirty years to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, is a failure. Saddam Hussein
was able to acquire a significant nuclear capability and to keep most of
this program secret from the International Atomic Energy Agency and
Western spy organizations even after the United Nations had been given
carte blanche to investigate on the ground. The implication is that a
country with a well-educated cadre and financial resources will be able
to acquire nuclear weapons unless the international inspection and con-
trol regime is radically improved.
Controlling the spread of chemical and biological technology will
be even more difficult. In both cases, legitimate economic and com-
mercial activities are difficult to distinguish from illegitimate programs.
A fertilizer plant can very quickly be retooled to produce lethal chemi-
cal agents. A pharmaceutical factory can easily disguise the production
of biological materials. Modem technology easily jumps international
boundaries. It was discovered two months ago that someone had put an
accurate formula for the production of the deadly virus anthrax on the
Internet, free for the taking by anyone who logged on. In sum, local
and regional conflicts are likely to be more prevalent in the coming
years and also more lethal.
4. Terrorism
In case this has not sufficiently depressed you, there will also be
continued terrorism interacting with several of the other trends I men-
tioned.
Over the past two decades, terrorism sprung largely from unful-
filled Palestinian aspirations in the Middle East and from radical fringes
of Western societies (groups like Action Directe in France, the Baader-
[Vol. 4:1
POLITICAL RISKS
Meinhof Gang in Germany, and the Weathermen in the United States).
The radical left groups, with some important but small exceptions, have
been contained by good intelligence and relentless police work.
On the other hand, terrorism in the Middle East is likely to contin-
ue in the years ahead. It is a special paradox of the region that whenev-
er in the past 45 years there has been progress toward peace there,
terrorism increases (as we have seen over the past two weeks in Israel).
That is because the radical groups do not accept that there can be a
negotiated outcome. Their objective is to destroy Israel. So when talks
or peace conferences start up, the terrorists' objective is to derail the
process, by using terrorism to kill either Israelis (to undermine domestic
support for the talks) or Arabs (to warn them of the price of accom-
modation). We can hope that if peace can finally be established in the
Middle East, these criminals will be marginalized and eventually de-
feated.
Ethnic terrorism grew rapidly in the 1980s-in Spain, in Sri Lanka
and in Peru. It is the one kind of terrorism against which the interna-
tional community has had little success. Ethnic terrorism is particularly
difficult to combat because the terrorists usually find safe refuge among
fellow tribesmen and are therefore difficult to identify and control. And
yet, given increasing ethnic tensions in the years ahead, ethnic terrorism
will certainly spread. The most likely candidates are the string of coun-
tries located along the Southern rim of the former Soviet Union where
ethnic and, in some cases, religious hatreds run deep. Already Russia
has faced increased Chechen terror. There will be more.
Finally, terrorists will probably seek to use modem technology in
more sophisticated attacks. Already laser targeting devices and long-
delay fuses have been used. We have already seen the first, and omi-
nous, major acts of chemical terrorism in the Tokyo subway system.
For all of these reasons, it is likely that, rather than ushering in a
new era of peace and stability, the collapse of communism and the Rus-
sian Empire will coincide with a new period of instability. Or, one
might say that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the answer to our
prayers. It just wasn't the answer we prayed for.
III. AssEssMENT OF RISK
What can a businessman or woman do to investigate potential risks
in the post-Cold War world? First, he must understand the nature of the
risks-political and economic. And then he must assess those risks on a
country-by-country basis.
The main political risks are:
1. Political and social instability or unrest caused by:
a. poor economic conditions;
b. religious, ethnic or national strife;
1996]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
c. dissatisfied elites or middle classes; and
d. regional disparities or rivalries.
2. Civil war
3. International war
The main economic risks are:
1. slow real economic growth (economic growth too slow to keep
up with population growth, at a minimum);




5. nationalization of private/foreign-owned enterprises;
6. default on national debt;
7. corruption;
8. undeveloped or underdeveloped body of commercial law or
commercial court system.
While I have separated the political and economic risks into two
discrete categories, it is obvious that there is an interplay between them.
A country with poor economic growth is vulnerable to political and
social unrest. A country with a brittle, undeveloped political system is
less able to cope with the fluid demands of a global economy.
In sum, any businessman or women contemplating serious overseas
activities in the post-war world will need the analytical skills usually
associated with diplomacy. Just as our diplomats, to be effective, in
promoting American interests will need to be more knowledgeable
about business.
IV. CONCLUSION
I realize that this presentation has been rather somber. But since I
was asked to focus on the risks of international business in the post-
Cold War era, I have necessarily emphasized potential problem areas.
Nonetheless, the basic fact is that the world is a much safer place today
than it was 10 years ago. And a much larger portion of the world un-
derstands that markets, not governments, are better arbiters of economic
progress. There will be huge opportunities for businesses in the years
ahead.
But this will be a turbulent decade. Many of the forces which
dominate today's headlines will see to that-nationalism, ethnic strife,
terrorism and religious extremism. For the past 45 years, the world
avoided global war because there was a relative balance between two
competing visions of society and their advocates. As the world's su-
perpowers, America and Russia pulled into their respective orbits the
countries of Europe and Asia, forming alliance systems which contrib-
uted to stabilizing those regions. True, war raged, more than 160 of
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them by one count, in those years. And some 16 million people were
killed. But the bipolar system did help contain most of those conflicts
and the unimaginable consequences of a nuclear war were avoided.
The collapse of that bipolar system presents today's statemen with
an enormous challenge, at least as great as that faced by the post-Cold
War leaders: how to assure that a new equilibrium is struck, one which
takes into account the vigorous new forces at work while seeking to
limit and contain the inevitable differences among nations.
Businesspeople, too, have a huge stake in the outcome, for success or
failure will dramatically impact the risks of doing business abroad.

